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Abstract
The paper develops estimation of three parameters of banking risk based on an explicit model
of expected utility maximization by financial institutions subject to the classical technology restric-
tions of neoclassical production theory. The parameters are risk aversion, prudence or downside
risk aversion and generalized risk resulting from a factor model of loan prices. The model can be
estimated using standard econometric techniques, like GMM for dynamic panel data and latent
factor analysis for the estimation of covariance matrices. An explicit functional form for the utility
function is not needed and we show how measures of risk aversion and prudence (downside risk
aversion) can be derived and estimated from the model. The model is estimated using data for
Eurozone countries and we focus particularly on (i) the use of the modeling approach as a device
close to an “early warning mechanism”, (ii) the bank- and country-specific estimates of risk aversion
and prudence (downside risk aversion), and (iii) the derivation of a generalized measure of risk that
relies on loan-price uncertainty. Moreover, the model provides estimates of loan price distortions
and thus, allocative efficiency.
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1 Introduction
Recent problems with the banking sector have put issues of modeling risk at the forefront of research.
Traditional risk measures like the z-score or the standard deviation of the returns on assets (ROA) are
used widely but have no formal economic justification. In turn, questions related to financial stability
which are intimately related to risk, remain unanswered. As one analyst remarks: “The problems of
creating a solvency test for financials that operate in real-time or relative real-time is not easy. It’s not
hard to do after the fact, but at any one time, no one – not even the directors of the company really
know what is embedded in the books at a financial [institution]. Société Générale, Barings, Northern
Rock, Bear Stearns – the list of surprise blowup go on and on.” (Hui, 2008).
Before proceeding it is important to clarify what we mean by risk in our setting. Each bank has a
utility function (defined over profit) which is known to the bank but unknown to us. Outputs of the
bank are various kinds of loans, and inputs include capital, labor and deposits -the so called financial
intermediation approach to modeling banking technology. Output prices are stochastic and the bank
maximizes expected utility of profits. Alternative approaches exist and we compare and contrast our
results in Section 6.
In this paper we propose a structural model (although not a general equilibrium model as in Aspachs
et al, 2006). The essential features of the model are, however, the same as we rely on the metrics of bank
profitability and the probability of default explicitly through the financial institution’s optimization
problem. The model can be estimated using standard econometric techniques, like GMM for dynamic
panel data and latent factor analysis for the estimation of covariance matrices. The model relies on
expected utility maximization for a financial institution under uncertain loan prices. An important
feature of the model is that it relies on the neoclassical approach to optimization with a well-defined
technology set provided by its representation via a distance function. An explicit functional form for
the utility function is not needed and we show how measures of risk aversion and prudence (downside
risk aversion) can be derived and estimated from the model. The model is estimated using data for
Eurozone countries and we focus particularly on:
(i) the use of the modeling approach as an “early warning mechanism” to the extent possible since
only one crisis observation is available., (ii) the bank- and country-specific estimates of risk aversion
and prudence (downside risk aversion); and
(iii) the derivation of a generalized measure of risk that relies on the loan-price uncertainty. The
generalized measure of risk is generic to the bank system but it is time-varying.
(i) and (ii) rely on an expansion of the unknown utility function of the banks to estimate risk




Arrow-Pratt measure, and δ = u
′′′(µΠ)
u′(µΠ)
as the measure of downside risk aversion or “prudence”, where
u() is the utility function and µΠ denotes expected profits. It is important to mention that these
measures can be estimated on a time-varying basis from the first order conditions of expected utility
maximization of profits and that they are different for each bank.
The aim of the paper is to provide measures of risk close to what is known as “systemic risk”, an
issue that has naturally attracted considerable attention in the literature; see, for example Yang et al.
(2010) and Yang and Zhou (2013). Yang et al. (2010) develop conditional co-skewness in the context
of a bivariate regime-switching model and show that it is important for portfolio construction. In our
context, conditional co-skewness matters as it relates to “prudence” through the third derivative of
the utility function. Yang and Zhou (2013) focus on spillovers among financial institutions. Spillovers
and interrelations among banks in this paper are taken into account via a dynamic factor model so an
important aspect is taken into account.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model and main results are presented in
section 2. The primal approach and its disadvantages are discussed in section 3. Data and estimation
techniques are presented in section 4. The empirical results are discussed in section 5. We compare and
contrast our results with alternative approaches in Section 6. The paper concludes with a summary of
the approach and results.
2
2 The model
Suppose x ∈ <K+ is a vector of inputs, w ∈ <K+ is the vector of input prices, y ∈ <M+ a vector of
outputs and p ∈ <M+ is the vector of their prices. We think of outputs as various types of loans while
inputs include capital, labor etc.
The technology set is defined by:
T = {(x,y) ∈ <K+M : x can producey}
Suppose (x,y) ∈ T if and only if: F (x,y) ≥ 1 for a general transformation function F (x,y). The
banks face uncertain output prices as some loans might not perform or, alternatively, they perform to
an extent that is unknown to the bank -which is the source of risk here. Suppose
p = µ+ C ′ε (1)
where µ is a location parameter (the mean if exists), ε ∼ NM (0, I) and C ′C = Σ, the covariance
matrix assuming it exists. The lower diagonal matrix C is related to the Cholesky decomposition of
Σ which is assumed positive definite. The profit of the bank is: Π = p′y − w′x − κ where κ denotes
fixed costs -see also Appelbaum and Ullah (1997).1 The bank maximizes the expected utility of profits:





y −w′x− κ = µΠ + ε′Cy, (2)
where expected profit is:
µΠ = µ
′y −w′x− κ.








, s.tF (x,y) ≥ 1. (3)
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,m = 2, ...,M, (5)
where σ2m is the mth diagonal element of Σ and µ = [µm,m = 1, ...,M ]. Equation (4) shows that
expected utility maximization requires cost minimization, as expected. In (5) we have defined the
following expressions which will become quite important in our discussion:
Λm ≡ E {u
′ (Π) εm}
E u′ (Π)
, m = 1, ...,M (6)
From (5) it is clear that expected utility maximization is consistent with ordinary profit maximiza-
tion at relative output (or shadow) prices which are given by:
p˜m ≡ µm + σmΛm
µ1 + σ1Λ1
, m = 2, ...,M. (7)
If, in fact, the transformation function is an output distance function, then exploiting its linear
homogeneity with respect to outputs, we can establish (5) in a somewhat different form:
1See papers by Kumbhakar (2002a,b), Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2010) and Kumbhakar and Tveteras (2013). These
papers do not deal with the (arguably more difficult) case of multiple outputs and thus many output prices which is the
focus of the present paper.
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, m = 1, ...,M (8)
We denote α = −u′′(µΠ)u′(µΠ) as the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion and δ =
u′′′(µΠ)
u′(µΠ)
as the measure of
downside risk aversion or “prudence”. We have α > 0 and, normally, we would expect that δ ≥ 0. The
left-hand-side of (8) would provide the virtual relative prices, p˜m that would be consistent with classical
profit maximization - prices are normalized so that they lie on the boundary of the unit simplex in
<M . Besides the first two moments of prices, these virtual prices depend on Λms which are related to
the underlying utility function as in (7). Naturally, we wish to avoid expressing the utility function in
a specific functional form since that would make the analysis specific to the particular functional form.
In that way, we see that what we have assumed so far is enough to deliver measures of Arrow-Pratt
measures of risk aversion as well as downside risk aversion.
As we show below, we have:
Λ ' − α
1 + δ·tr (yy′Σ) · Cy (9)
which is an M × 1 vector whose elements are the Λms.
Proof of equation (9)
Our purpose is, first of all, to derive expressions for E u′ (Π) as well as E {u′ (Π) ε}, whereΠ = µΠ+ε′Cy.
Using a Taylor approximation around ε = 0(M×1) we have:
u′ (Π) ' u′ (µΠ) + u′′ (µΠ) ε′Cy + u′′′ (µΠ) ε′Cyy′C ′ε.
Taking expected values we obtain:
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1 + δtr (yy′Σ)
· Cy

Therefore, the Λms can be related to two fundamental characteristics of risk, namely the Arrow-
Pratt measures α and δ. It is important to emphasize that these measures depend on underlying bank
profitability (since the banks maximize expected utility of profit) as well “probability of default” in the
sense that loan price uncertainty is explicitly taken into account.
Next, we show how to estimate risk aversion and prudence parameters under output price uncer-
tainty. The data requirementws are inputs xit and outputs yit of the bank and their prices wit and
pit respectively. Suppose the output-distance-function F (xit,yit; θ) where θ ∈ <d denotes a vector of
unknown technology parameters.




∂ logF (x,y) /∂ log ym
∂ logF (x,y) /∂ log y1
,m = 2, ...,M, (10)
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+ log ym − log y1 = log
{
∂ logF (x,y) /∂ log ym
∂ logF (x,y) /∂ log y1
}
. (11)
The econometric model consists of the output-distance-function:
F (xit,yit;θ) = vit,1, (12)




+ log ym,it − log y1,it = log
{
∂ logF (xit,yit;θ) /∂ log ym,it
∂ logF (xit,yit;θ) /∂ log y1,it
}




+ log xk,it − log x1,it = log
{
∂ logF (xit,yit;θ) /∂ log xk,it
∂ logF (xit,yit;θ) /∂ log x1,it
}
+ eit,k, k = 2, ...,K, (14)
where p˜m is a complicated function of α, δ, µ, C and y as defined in (7). Recall that C ′C = Σ. Finally,




= γm,it + log
p˜m,it
p˜1,it
+ ξit,m,m = 2, ...,M, (15)
where γit = [γ2,it, ..., γM,it]′ is a vector of systematic deviations and ξit = [ξit,2, ..., ξit,M ]′ is a vector
of random variables. In fact, these are related to allocative inefficiency distortions (Kumbhakar, 1997
and Kumbhakar and Tsionas, 2005).
The error terms are Vit = [vit,2, ..., vit,M , eit,2, ..., eit,K , ξit,2, ..., ξit,K ]′. We do not impose particular
assumptions about these error terms other than they are orthogonal to variables involved in our moment
conditions. For example, we do not make distributional assumptions. The output distance function is
defined by a flexible, translog functional form which is used extensively in the literature:



















m=1 γkmxi,tkyi,tm + vit,1,
(16)
where ai and bt represent bank and time effects2, K is the number of inputs (xi,tk in logs), M is the
number of outputs (yi,tm in logs) and i = 1, ..., n represents a particular observation for the vector
of all inputs xit ∈ <K and outputs yit∈ <M . As a transformation function we have F (xit,yit) = 1.
From linear homogeneity of output distance function with respect to outputs, in log terms, we have
F (xit, h+yit) = h+F (xit,yit) for any constant h so we may choose the constant to be the first output
which results in:



















m=2 γkmxi,tky˜i,tm + vit,1,
(17)
where y˜it,m ≡ yit,m − yit,1,m = 2, ...,M .
We allow for the endogeneity of yit, xit and output prices pit using GMM with instruments be-
ing log-relative input prices and time dummies. The instruments are motivated by the first-order
conditions of profit maximization. Our implementation of GMM is the so-called CUE (continuously-
updated-estimator) which has been shown to have better finite sample properties. Joint estimation of
the first-order conditions in (13)-(17) is quite difficult because of the dependence on Λms which are
highly nonlinear functions of α and δ.3
In terms of estimation we proceed as follows:
i) We estimate jointly (17) and (14) by GMM to estimate the technology parameters, θ.
2In addition we include effects for commercial, investment, cooperative and savings banks.
3Another difficulty is that the first order conditions must be estimated in log form and we need to take account of the
Jacobian of transformation due to endogeneity of the variables involved. Using GMM this is automatically taken into
account.
5
















iii) In turn, given log p˜m,itp˜1,it we solve
4 for bank-specific and time-varying estimates of αit, δit given
the expressions in (7) and (9). Parameters µ and Σare assumed the same for all banks and years in the
same country but different across countries and are estimated using their sample counterparts from
(1).
iv) Parameters γm and estimates ξˆit,m can be recovered, if desired, from GMM estimation of (15).
The fundamental merit of this estimation procedure is that we can obtain bank-specific and time-
varying estimates of αit, δit without a random effects assumption which necessitates distributional
assumptions.
Next, we use the normalizing restriction
∑M
m′=1 (µm′ + σm′Λm′) = 1 that output prices lie on the
boundary of the unit simplex in <M . The restriction implies a relationship between α and δ. In turn,
from Λm in (9) we can recover one of α or δ while the other can be recovered from the restriction. As
Λ is both time-varying and bank- specific we can exploit this fact to deliver time-varying and bank-
specific estimates of both α and δ.
The output distance function and first order conditions (14) as well as (15) are estimated separately
for all banks in each country. Estimation of the output distance function includes bank- and time-
specific fixed effects and is performed using the CUE version of GMM starting from a random selection
of initial conditions for the parameters, centered around the OLS estimator.
Random initial conditions are generated using 100 different random seeds. Different initial con-
ditions did not lead to different parameter estimates suggesting that, in this instance, the objective
function is not multimodal.
Given an R × 1 set of moment conditions E g (θ,Yi) = O(R×1) where θ ∈ Θ ⊆ <k, Yi denotes all
available data, the empirical analogue is5:
min
θ∈Θ















for some weighting matrixW, where N denotes the number of available observations. In the first stage
we setW = I, the identity matrix. Since the optimal weighting matrix isW−1 ∝ E [g (θ,Y ) g (θ,Y )′]
the problem is re-solved using W−1 = N−1
∑N
i=1 g (θ,Yi) g (θ,Yi). Therefore, the optimization prob-
lem for CUE-GMM is the following:



















∂θ , the well-known asymptotic result can be used to obtain the asymptotic












Moreover, Hansen’s J-statistic J = Nf (θ)→ χ2R−k. The same strategy is used to estimate, first, (17)
and (14), and, second, (15).
4This involves a solution in terms of α, δ of a nonlinear system of equations given the data, (7) and (9).
5We rely on moment conditions using as instruments the inputs and time as well as their squares and interactions
plus country-specific effects. Hansen’s J test has a p-value of 0.31 failing to reject the null hypothesis of orthogonality
between output distance function errors and the specific instruments. Exclusion of country-specific effects produces a
Hansen test whose p-value is 0.001. The minimization problem is solved using a standard conjugate-gradients algorithm.
More computational details are available on request.
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3 Generalized Measure of Risk
For the M × 1 vector of output prices p we have observations for a given country (c = 1, ..., C) and
a given bank within a country (b = 1, ..., Bc). So, in practice, the vector pct = [pcb,t] is possibly very
high-dimensional for a given time period (t = 1, ..., T ). This is especially the case because we want
to combine countries (for example, peripheral countries or PIIGS versus non-periphery.) Moreover, in
order to estimate the time-varying conditional covariance matrix of prices, Σt, we must account for
the fact that they do not have a constant conditional mean. Since we do not typically have large T
(but we do have large N where N is the number of banks and T is the number of time periods) we
assume the following process:
pcb,t = ab +Acpcb,t−1 + ucb,t. (20)
The vector pcb,t is M × 1 which is low-dimensional since in the leading case we have two or three
outputs. NotationAc means that estimation is performed using data for all banks in a given country c.
Here, ab is M × 1 and A is matrix M ×M . The process is a vector autoregression with a time-varying
covariance matrix. The notation ab means that we include bank-specific effects. The model in 20 is
estimated using data for a given country and all banks and time periods available for that country (or
group of countries.) The model can be estimated using standard GMM techniques for dynamic panel
data. We use moments of the type proposed in Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1999) [also Handbook of Econometrics, chapter 53].
The modeling of a dynamic covariance matrix in large dimensions is well known to be an exceedingly
difficult matter and standard extensions of the GARCH model do not work well, see for example Engle
and Kroner (1995) and Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2009).6
Given the residuals7 uˆcb,t we follow Connor and Korajczyk (1986, 1988), Stock and Watson (2002),
Bai and Ng (2002, 2011) and Bai (2003) to model the time-varying covariance matrix using a latent
factor model with the principal components simplification, which has been shown to work well in
practice (see in addition Bai and Li (2010), Forni et al (2000) and Lehmann and Modest (1988)).
Suppose Xt = [uˆc1,t, ..., uˆcBc,t]
′ for simplicity in notation. The latent factor model in vector form is:
Xit = µi + λ
′
ift + εit, (21)
where the factors ft (r×1) and factor loadings λi (r×1) are unobserved. Here, the index i corresponds
to (c, b). In matrix notation we have8:
Xt = µ+Λft + εt, (22)
where Λ = [λ1, ..., λN ]′ and µ, εt are defined in conformable manner. Moreover,
µt ≡ µ+Λft, (23)








where S is the sample covariance matrix, b2i is the i th largest eigenvalue and hi denotes the corre-
sponding eigenvector (Bai and Shi, 2011). The principal components estimator for Λ is then given
by:
6See also Bai and Shi (2011) for the wider issues in high-dimensional settings, along with Bai and Ng (2008), Bai and
Li (2010), Bai (2010), Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983), and Jones (2001).
7Suppose uˆt = [uˆc1,t, ..., uˆcB,t]′. It is to be noted that since uˆt = ut + (uˆt − ut) = ut + et and et = op (1) the analysis
carries through in the sense that the principal component analysis is asymptotically valid.
8Λ is not to be confused with Λm s.
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is the estimator for the diagonal covariance of the error terms εt. The
advantage of the estimator despite, of course, its simplicity is that it can be applied for a given time
period, treating different banks as variables within a given country and a given time period, yielding
consistent estimators for Σˆt (Bai, 2003, 2004). There are a number of procedures to select the number
of factors, r, see Bai and Ng (2012) who proposed information criteria.
Estimates µˆt and Σˆt, can be obtained as follows. First, µˆt can be obtained from (23) after µ
and Λ have been estimated by standard maximum likelihood techniques. Since estimation is done
period-by-period an unrestricted covariance matrix Σt can be estimated based on Bai (2003, 2004) to
avoid restrictive assumptions about its elements.
The data set9 includes commercial, cooperative, savings, investment and real-estate banks in Eu-
rozone countries that are listed in the IBCA-Bankscope database over the period 2001–2011 . After
reviewing the data for reporting errors and other inconsistencies we obtain an unbalanced panel dataset
of 29,023 observations, which includes a total of 4,065 different banks . For the definition of bank in-
puts and outputs, we follow the vast majority of the literature and employ the financial intermediation
approach10proposed by Sealey and Lindley (1977), which assumes that the bank collects funds, using
labor and physical capital, and transforms them into loans and other earning assets. In particular, we
specify three inputs, labor, physical capital and financial capital, and two outputs, loans and other
earning assets (which include government securities, bonds, equity investments, CDs, T-bills, and eq-
uity investment). With respect to input prices, the price of financial capital is computed by dividing
total interest expenses by total interest bearing borrowed funds, while the price of labor is defined as
the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. Moreover, the price of physical capital is defined as the
ratio of other administrative expenses to fixed assets. Regarding the calculation of output prices, the
price of loans is defined as the ratio of interest income to total loans, while the price of other earning
assets is defined as total non-interest income to total other earning assets11.
The number of banks by year included in our sample is: 2001: 2,214; 2002: 2,028; 2003: 1,909;
2004: 1,994; 2005: 3,053; 2006: 3,075; 2007: 3,042; 2008: 2,990; 2009: 2,951; 2010: 2,949 and 2011:
2,818. The additions to the sample are not necessarily new market entrants, but rather successful
banks that are added to the database over time. Exits from the sample are due either to bank failures
or to mergers with other banks or are a consequence of changes in the coverage of the Bankscope
database. Our sample covers the largest credit institutions in each country, as defined by their balance
sheet aggregates. Due to the specific features of the German banking system (large number of relatively
small banks), our sample is dominated by German banks. Descriptive statistics of the data are provided
in the Appendix.
Breaking the sample into periphery versus non-periphery as well as France and Germany sepa-
rately, we can apply the factor model in (22) for separate samples whose dimensionality is less than
the dimensionality of the full sample in terms of the number of banks. In turn we can apply the
principal-components estimator in (25) and (26). The principal-components estimator has also been
applied to each country separately following preliminary estimation of (20). For the factor models, the
use of Schwarz information criterion (Bai and Ng, 2012) which turned out to give one factor for the
vast majority of cases, including the groups of periphery, non-periphery as well as France and Germany
taken separately as a two-country group.
9The author is grateful to Natasha Koutsomanoli-Filippaki who generously provided the data set and its description.
10For a review of the various approaches that have been proposed in the literature for the definition of bank inputs
and outputs see Berger and Humphrey (1992).
11The Bankscope database reports published financial statements from banks worldwide, homogenized into a global
format, which are comparable across countries and therefore suitable for a cross-country study. Nevertheless, it should
be noted that all countries suffer from the same survival bias.
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4 Empirical results
The expected utility framework provides a wealth of information regarding risk in financial interme-
diation. First of all, we report results12 related to Arrow-Pratt measures of risk aversion (α) and
downside risk aversion (δ). These measures are bank-specific as well as time-varying due to the so-
lution of equation in (15). Second, the use of a latent factor model as in (22) provides a generalized
measure of risk which is given by the determinant det (Σt) or its log. This measure of risk relies on all
output prices collectively. Although it reflects the “risk” of the banking system as a whole it should be
accompanied by considerations of risk aversion, formalized by estimates of α and δ. This is important
as there cannot be a single measure of “risk” without a reference framework provided by a behavioral
assumption which, in this paper, is expected utility maximization. In that way, financial stability
depends not only on underlying, statistical or econometric measures of risk like the z-score or even the
generalized variance det (Σt) but rather on the propensity of the system to increase risk aversion and
prudence (downside risk aversion) during periods of crises. Conversely, an increase of risk accompanied
by an increase in risk aversion and prudence can show that a crisis is developing and can, at least in
principle, provide us with an early warning mechanism.
There remains the question of whether measures of risk aversion and prudence are rather retrospec-
tive in nature since, for example, risk aversion can rise in response to a crisis. From the perspective
of expected utility maximization and almost every other behavioral assumption based on optimization
(excluding cost minimization) this cannot be the case. Since the bank has more information about its
assets, capital and loan performance, it will react to a deterioration of its financial position by taking
the appropriate measures, before a generalized crisis has taken place. The bank will not react to the
generalized crisis but rather to its own deterioration of financial indices based on its own optimizations
using its own information. Distress signals from the entire banking sector will contribute to an increase
of risk aversion and prudence, but this is the retrospective, not the prospective element lying at the
heart of an increase in measures of prudence and risk aversion.
In Figures 1 and 2 we provide histograms of these key parameters across all financial institutions
and years. Relevant estimates are provided in Tables 1, 2 and 3 in the next section (where we provide
a comparison with other risk measures).
These distributions, which combine evidence from all countries and all time periods are clearly mul-
timodal indicating at least that there is considerable heterogeneity either over time or across banking
systems in different countries. We use the term “periphery” for Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and
Spain.
In Figure 3, estimates of risk aversion are reported for the European banking system excluding
the periphery (thick line), France, Germany and the periphery’s banking system. It is impressive that
risk aversion in the system as a whole (excluding peripheral countries) started increasing before the
sub-prime crisis. Yet, for peripheral countries this happened after the crisis had been developed. It
remains important, however, that an early warning signal is indeed at work here as overall risk aversion
for the system started increasing at least one year before the sub-prime crisis. However, as only one
crisis observation is available, we prefer to take this as evidence rather than as definitive conclusion.
In Figure 4, measures of prudence (downside risk aversion) are reported. For the system as a whole
(excluding the periphery) as well as for France and Germany prudence increases steadily throughout
2001-2011. For the periphery the 2000s start with negative downside risk aversion which increases to
values around zero and ends up with values close to 1.5.
In Figure 5, the generalized risk (variance) measures are reported. These measures are increasing
throughout the 2001-2011 period indicating the accumulation of risk resulting from the expansion of
credit. Possibly as the result of adopting policies of fiscal restraint13, the generalized risk especially for
12To avoid cluttering the paper, we present results in graphical form. All estimation results are available on request.
13Fiscal restraint refers to consolidation in national budgets, and the restructuring of policies related to taxes and
public expenditures in the periphery. Countries like Ireland, Portugal and Greece were subjected to so called “austerity”
or adjustment programs in order to make their debt sustainable and recapitalize the banking sector. These policies are
well known in the EU and the international press, have been active in criticizing or supporting them over the years after
2009. Recapitalization of banks for example and bail out packages were huge. We prefer not to model these variables
explicitly for three reasons. First, we do not know from the data base we use (or any other publicly available) how each
bank was bailed out. Second, the rescue plans are reflected in the background to our model and, therefore, they should
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the periphery seems to decrease during 2010-2011 for the system as a whole (except the periphery) as
well as France and Germany but notably not for the peripheral countries themselves.
In Figure 6, risk aversion coefficient (α ) sample distributions are reported for the peripheral
countries over time. These distributions result from bank- and country-specific measures. These
distributions are evidently non-normal and show the evolution of risk aversion over time from, basically,
lower to higher values. It is not until 2008 that the financial system in the peripheral countries starts
to develop increasing aversion towards risk, that is in the middle or even after the sub-prime crisis. The
distributions clearly shift to the right after 2007-2008 showing that the banking system adjusted with a
considerable lag, contrary to the non-periphery whose (aspects of) sample distributions are summarily
reported in Figure 3. For non-peripheral countries the distributions of risk aversion started shifting
to the right as early as 2006 providing most likely an “early warning mechanism” with regard to the
following sub-prime crisis: We consider this an important aspect of the model in terms of modeling
and forecasting financial stability -although, as we mentioned before, only one crisis observation is
available.
In terms of interpreting our results, we feel that the following point is important: In the core coun-
tries it was the toxic assets that were the issue. The crisis stemed from the banks. This is true for some
peripheral countries as well, e.g. Spain. In peripheral countries such as Greece, for example, the crisis
moves from the sovereign to the banks. This distinct aspect of the crisis, with its dichotomy between
periphery versus non-periphery, provides an explanation for the findings in Figure 3 and onwards. It is,
for example, well known that the financial turmoil in late 2007 resulting from the collapse of the mort-
gage market was due to the unprecedented issuance volume of credit default swaps (CDS) from 1998
to 2007 (Stanton and Wallace, 2011). Buch, Eckmeier, and Prieto (2014) analyzed a macroeconomic
vector autoregression for the United States with a set of factors summarizing conditions in about 1,500
commercial banks. Their main findings are as follows: “Backward-looking risk of a representative bank
declines, and bank lending increases following expansionary shocks. Forward-looking risk increases
following an expansionary monetary policy shock. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the
transmission of macroeconomic shocks, which is due to bank size, capitalization, liquidity, risk, and the
exposure to real estate and consumer loans”. Another channel through which substantial heterogeneity
in the transmission of macroeconomic shocks can arise, is precisely because of, possibly substantial,
heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion which, in this paper, is the main focus of our modeling and
estimation. We find that risk aversion as well as downside risk aversion vary over time. This leaves
open the possibility that it is the risk attitudes of banks that are responsible for the heterogeneity
in their responses instead of “forward-looking” or “backward-looking” risk. At any rate, through the
application of simple estimation techniques, we are able to deliver bank-specific and time-varying es-
timates of important aspects of risk along with a generalized risk measure of the banking sector with
a solid foundation in economic theory.
5 Comparison with alternative approaches
5.1 General discussion
A well known risk measure is the z-score defined as z = R+capσR , where R is a measure of return like the
return on assets (ROA) or the return on equity (ROE), cap stands for the capitalization ratio, and σR
is a measure of volatility of return. The Z-score is widely used in the banking literature to measure a
bank’s probability of insolvency. It is attributed to Boyd and Graham (1986), Hannan and Hanweck
(1988) and Boyd et al. (1993), and plays an important role in the assessment of both individual bank
risk as well as overall financial stability.
The problems with such a catch-all measure, apart from its apparent simplicity are many: (i) It
does not account for the degree of risk aversion implicit in the construction of portfolios of financial
institutions. (ii) It does not provide by itself an estimate, when used in practice, of the proper measure
of variance; which is why in many studies panel data is used (see the excellent study by Lepetit
how up as deep restructuring in the deposits – loans relation, the loan totals and their composition. Third, as a result
of that they are expected to show up in different estimates of risk aversion, prudence and generalized risk if the model
is anywhere close to reality.
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and Strobel, 2013). (iii) Although insolvency is, apparently, of interest, there is a transition stage to
insolvency characterized by increasing “risk”. This “risk” is difficult to measure when using the z-score.
(iv) Consequently, it becomes increasingly apparent that it is difficult to find a proper measure of “risk”,
such as var (X) , making the calculation of z-scores problematic and the construction of “early warning
signals” quite difficult. For example, in time series studies, the measurement of variance does not allow,
so far at least, for time-varying measures while in panel studies, repeated cross sections have to be
used: Since it is implicitly assumed that the variance remains constant over time for the same financial
institution, this introduces significant biases in the measurement of insolvency or the assessment of
financial stability. (vi) The development of the literature on financial stability tends to move away
from the simple z-score and adopts a wider perspective on “risk”. There is the related literature on
identification of banking crises and construction of early warning mechanisms, see, for example, Berg
(1999), Disyatat (2001), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2011), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996, 1999),
Logan (2000), and Vila (2000).
As stated in a seminal paper by Aspachs, Goodhart, Segoviano, Tsomocos and Zicchino (2006):
“In the ECB Financial Stability Review (December, 2005, p. 131), it is stated bluntly
that “there is no obvious framework for summarising developments in financial stability
in a single quantitative manner.” This is, to say the least, a considerable disadvantage
when attempting to analyse financial stability issues. As the same ECB Special Feature on
‘Measurement Challenges in Assessing Financial Stability’, (ibid) put it, ’Financial stability
assessment as currently practiced by central banks and international organisations probably
compares with the way monetary policy assessment was practised by central banks three
or four decades ago – before there was a widely accepted, rigorous framework.” ’
The authors proceed to argue as follows:
“The point to note here is not so much the details [...] but that the crucial aspects of the
impact of shocks on the banking system are contained in two variables, bank profitability
and bank repayment rate, which in turn is equivalent to its probability of default (PD) ...”
(page 8).
Another approach is based on the concept of the Value at Risk (VaR). For any random variable X
with distribution function F and a given α ∈ (0, 1) we have: VaR = min {y|F (y) ≥ α} = α. If the
distribution is continuous, F (VaR) = α so it is a particular quantile. For example, the Derivatives
Policy Group in 2005 proposed a standard for over-the-counter derivatives broker-dealer reports to the
Securities and Exchange Commission that would set a time horizon of two weeks and α = 0.01. For
more details see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004).
This paper falls squarely within this literature. We focus on a concept of risk directly related to the
performance of loans. Since this cannot be known in advance there is genuine uncertainty about the
performance of financial institutions. This uncertainty must be taken formally into account in modeling
properly the risk of financial institutions. In turn, this requires modeling the financial technology and
embedding the problem in solid economic theory, provided by expected utility maximization. The
framework of expected utility maximization goes, in fact, a long way in terms of measurement and
assessment of risk, performance and stability. In this framework, we can provide explicit measures
of Arrow-Pratt risk aversion as well as measures of downside risk aversion. Moreover, risk premia
measures can be provided on a bank-specific basis. Hanschel and Monnin (2004) and Illing and Liu
(2003) are examples of two papers that search for a metric of financial stability, without relying on an
explicit structural model and focusing on the separate cases of Canada and Switzerland.
One problem with the widely used z-score is the volatility measure used in the denominator. For
example, Lepetit and Strobel (2013) “compare the different existing approaches to the construction
of time-varying z-score measures, plus an additional alternative one, using a panel of banks for the
G20 group of countries covering the period 1992–2009.” Their main finding is that the mean/standard
deviation of ROA for the full sample with the current capital-asset ratio is the preferred measure. The
use of the z-score as an indicator of bank stability has a long history, see for example de Nicolo (2000),
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Cihak (2007) and Maechler et al (2007). 14
Boyd & Graham (1986) and Boyd et al. (1993) have pointed out that 1/z2 is an upper bound of
the probability of insolvency (that is the probability of a bank having a negative capital asset ratio plus
ROA) from which it follows that the z-score can be used in the wider context of insolvency, prudence
and stability of financial institutions. Strobel (2015) made an excellent point in arguing that, in fact,
1
1+z2
provided a tighter bound on the probability of insolvency while 1
z2
provides a good upper bound
on the odds of insolvency. The two concepts are closely related as they are functionally related through
a simple mathematical transformation.
In Tables 1,2 and 3 we report estimates of risk aversion, downside risk aversion and the generalized
risk measure for certain groups of countries over time for the period 2001 through 2011.
Table 1. Measures of risk aversion
Year−→ 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Overall excl. periphery 2.32 2.50 2.42 2.50 2.44 1.01 1.30 1.52 4.43 5.51 5.30
France 1.72 1.81 1.93 2.60 1.81 0.72 3.72 3.40 3.92 6.20 6.29
Germany 2.49 2.68 2.11 2.52 2.03 3.51 3.72 3.90 4.74 5.80 5.68
Periphery 0.73 1.11 0.82 0.93 1.10 1.21 1.35 4.78 5.11 6.55 5.39
Table 2. Measures of downside risk aversion
Year−→ 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Overall excl. periphery 2.30 2.58 2.51 2.11 2.50 2.98 3.31 3.50 3.41 4.22 4.32
France 1.97 2.51 1.87 2.42 2.20 2.71 3.68 4.41 4.32 4.20 4.31
Germany 2.71 2.92 2.70 2.91 3.11 3.49 3.72 4.93 4.70 4.82 5.13
Periphery -0.70 -2.12 -2.80 -1.91 -1.10 -1.22 -0.032 0.21 0.52 0.51 1.50
Table 3. Measures of generalized risk
Year−→ 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Overall excl. periphery 1.00 1.70 1.61 1.82 1.90 3.76 6.12 9.13 15.4 17.2 11.2
France 1.00 1.81 1.41 2.10 3.20 3.15 7.98 10.1 17.1 19.1 13.1
Germany 1.00 1.31 1.11 1.32 1.20 2.15 5.14 5.10 6.12 12.20 9.11
Periphery 1.00 6.50 7.12 9.31 9.50 10.42 16.73 15.30 22.11 25.32 33.24
Some interesting conclusions are as follows: (i) Risk aversion increases over time. (ii) Prudence
increases for the periphery only after 2010 but increases considerably after 2008 for all other countries.
(iii) Generalized risk continues to increase in the periphery even during 2011 but this is not so for all
other countries. We have commented on some possible driving forces of these findings in the previous
section. Here, we would like to compare and contrast these estimates with some alternative measures
of risk. Based on the z-score we compute, directly from the data, the upper bound on the probability
of insolvency PI = 1
1+z2
as argued by Strobel (2015)15. This measure is provided in Table 4.
14Its widespread use is evidenced by such papers as Bannier et al. (2010), Barry et al. (2011), Beck et al. (2010),
Carbo-Valverde et al. (2011), Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache (2011), Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga (2010), Foos et al.
(2010), Houston et al. (2010), Koetter et al. (2012), Laeven & Levine (2009) and Schaeck et al. (2012).
15To compute the Z score we have used ROE.
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Table 4. Probability of insolvency
Year−→ 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Overall excl. periphery 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008
France 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.009
Germany 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.007
Periphery 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.014 0.122
Italy 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004
Greece 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.117 0.213
Spain 0.011 0.012 0.015 0.014 0.011 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.006
The comparison is interesting in the sense that both risk aversion measures and generalized risk
start increasing even before the sub-prime crisis but the probability of default, in Greece for example,
starts increasing considerably only after, roughly, 2009 or 2010 when the pressure on banking systems
was already felt. In this sense, z-based measures are retrospective but both risk aversion measures and
generalized risk are not, as they rely on more detailed (yet widely available) information on the price
of loans.
5.2 Panel composition
As we noted in Section 3, there is an increase in the number of banks after 2005. These are not
necessarily new market entrants, but rather successful banks that are added to the database over time.
It is a possibility that the composition of the panel affects the results. To examine this possibility we
re-estimate the econometric models using the same procedures -viz. CUE-GMM and factor analysis for
the generalized measure of risk. Our results for the important parameters of the model are reported in
Table 5. Since the estimates are obtained on a per country basis (using all banks and years available
for the given country) it is sufficient to look at the results for the overall cases (excluding PIIGS, the
periphery) to determine whether there are any differences.
Table 5. Results using the same banks since 2001
Year−→ 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Risk aversion, α 2.32 2.50 2.42 2.50 1.47 1.15 1.42 1.29 1.35 3.43 4.17
Downside risk, δ 2.30 2.58 2.51 2.11 1.57 1.05 1.22 1.43 2.52 2.57 4.45
Generalized Risk 1.00 1.70 1.61 1.82 3.22 4.88 7.25 11.45 17.2 21.1 15.32
A comparison of the results in Tables 5 and 1 through 3, shows that estimates of risk aversion and
downside risk aversion are much larger when the new entrants in the data base are considered. Some
differences in generalized risk show that the new entrants reduce the overall variance after 2010, so the
successful banks helped in the stabilization of the banking system but in other respects they did not
systematically affected risk during 2005-2009. Indeed, during 2005-2011 the generalized risk measures
are 1.90, 3.76, 6.12, 9.13, 15.4, 17.2, 11.2when we use the same banks as in 2001, and 3.22, 4.88, 7.25,
11.45, 17.2, 21.1, 15.32, when we use the entire data set, thus allowing for the new entrants.
To assess this difference statistically, we use the bootstrap where all yearly observations of a bank
are treated as a block and we implement the bootstrap on a per country basis (as our estimation
technique is performed individually for each country). The results are reported in Table 6.
Table 6. Bootstrap p-values
Year−→ 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
p-value, α 0.017 0.0016 0.0024 0.0015 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value, δ 0.021 0.019 0.0016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value, GRM 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The reported p-values test the significance of the generalized risk measure obtained from i) the
entire sample, and ii) the sample that results when do not include new entrants in the data base.
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For each of the 10,000 bootstrap replications the models are re-estimated under i) and ii) and the
empirical distribution of generalized risk measures is obtained. From the p-values in Table 6 it is clear
that the differences are statistically significant at conventional levels of statistical significance. The
differences in risk and downside risk of the new entrants, which are successful banks, can probably be
taken as responsible for the relative stabilization of the overall banking system after 2010 as well as
the containment of overall volatility in the years of turmoil.
5.3 Allocative efficiency
Our specification in (15) allows to estimate price distortions and, in turn, allocative inefficiency. It
is known that technical inefficiency results when a decision-making-unit does not produce maximum
output given its inputs (Ruggiero, 2000). Allocative inefficiency results when the input or output mix
is not optimal (Bogetoft, Fare, and Borge, 2006, Brissimis, Delis and Tsionas, 2010, Staub, Souza, and
Tabak, 2010). Here, the notion of optimality refers to expected utility maximization. As we remarked
in the discussion of (17) and (13) - (15), observed output prices are pmt and virtual or shadow prices
that would satisfy the first-order-conditions for expected utility maximization are p˜mt subject to some
normalization. The differences pmt− p˜mt are known as price distortions for all outputs (m = 1, ...,M).
Therefore, although the bank should use output prices p˜mt, the bank uses the observed prices, pmt. To





where pit, p˜it are the M × 1 vectors of observed and virtual prices, and yit is M × 1 the vector of
outputs.
Such estimates can be obtained easily from (15) which is estimated separately from (17) and (13).
Given estimated parameters θˆ from (17) and (13), and estimated of the risk parameters from (14),
equation (15) is estimated using a random-effects specification for γit = [γit,1, ..., γit,M ]′. The model
we estimate is:
log pi,tm = γit,m + log p˜it,m + ξit,m,m = 1, ...,M, (28)
ξit = [ξit,1, ..., ξit,M ]
′ ∼ i.i.d.NM (0,Ωξ), (29)
γit = [γit,1, ..., γit,M ]
′ = δi + λt. (30)
We use the normalizing restriction
∑M
m′=1 (µm′ + σm′Λm′) = 1, viz. output prices lie on the boundary
of the unit simplex in <M . In the specification (30) we decompose the systematic component γit into a
bank specific component, δi, and a time-varying effect λt. The overall error term ξit can be interpreted
as a bank-time effect. No assumption of independence between δi and λt is necessary nor assumptions
of independence with ξit. The model can be estimated using GMM using the same instruments as
the ones that were used in estimating (17) and (13). Our allocative efficiency estimates, defined as
AEit = exp(−AIit) are provided in Table 6.
Table 6. Allocative Efficiency
Year−→ 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Overall excl. periphery 0.816 0.810 0.781 0.774 0.732 0.710 0.688 0.631 0.716 0.812 0.893
France 0.811 0.814 0.794 0.782 0.744 0.722 0.655 0.620 0.628 0.833 0.902
Germany 0.891 0.932 0.871 0.844 0.831 0.806 0.733 0.710 0.724 0.876 0.923
Periphery 0.744 0.762 0.744 0.710 0.681 0.645 0.610 0.554 0.617 0.773 0.885
Greece 0.826 0.856 0.713 0.684 0.643 0.610 0.564 0.553 0.545 0.512 0.515
There is an interesting pattern emerging from the estimates in Table 6. First, there is a decline
in allocative efficiency of the banking system in the Eurozone excluding the peripheral countries from
2001-2002 and the trend reverses only after 2009. This decline followed by a recovery is evident also
in France and Germany. Second, the same is true for the peripheral countries but not in Greece whose
allocative efficiency declined from 82.6% in 2001 to nearly 51.5% in 2010 and 2011. The banking system
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in the periphery as a whole, however, increased its efficiency from 74.4% in 2001 to 88.5% in 2011. The
(almost) general increase in allocative efficiency after 2010 can, probably, be attributed to the bail-out
plans of the EU but also the re-orientation of the banking system towards more sound investments
along the lines of expected utility maximization. In this sense, recapitalization of European banks
through the intervention of the ECB resulted in better performance with the exception of Greece,
whose problems of the banking sector can be attributed to structural weaknesses in its economy.
The important evidence is, additionally, the decline in allocative efficiency throughout 2001-2009.
It is not entirely out of line to attribute this development to the policies of expanding credit and low
interest rates of the ECB. Artificially “cheap money”, quite naturally made many investments appear
more profitable than they truly were (in view of differential information between banks and investors
seeking funding of their projects) and, in that way, they magnified the wedge between actual and
virtual loan prices or costs. In turn, this is responsible for lower allocative efficiency over time. The
liquidation of unprofitable projects resulted in capitalization problems of the banking system that were
resolved only after the bail-out policies of the ECB and the exercise of more prudence by the banks.
As as saw, this resulted in higher risk aversion as well as downside risk aversion or prudence.
Concluding remarks
This paper has developed a new model of expected utility of profit maximization for financial institu-
tions, subject to the neoclassical production possibility restrictions. The essential feature of the model
is loan-price uncertainty in a multivariate context, an issue that has not been considered so far in the
literature. The model can be estimated using standard econometric techniques: GMM for dynamic
panel data along with latent factor analysis for the estimation of covariance matrices. An explicit
functional form for the utility function is not needed and we show how measures of risk aversion and
prudence (downside risk aversion) can be derived and estimated from the model. The model is es-
timated using data for Eurozone countries and we focus particularly on: (i) the use of the modeling
approach as an “early warning mechanism”; (ii) the bank- and country-specific estimates of risk aversion
and prudence (downside risk aversion); and (iii) the derivation of a generalized measure of risk that
relies on loan-price uncertainty. The empirical results show that prudential behavior and risk aversion
differ substantially among the periphery and the rest of the Eurozone, as well as compared to French
and German banks. Risk aversion in the French and German began to increase well in advance of the
sub-prime crisis. The same is true for the Eurozone excluding the periphery. For the periphery, risk
aversion followed the sub-prime crisis and started increasing only after 2008. Our generalized measure
of risk shows that risk has been building up in the Eurozone since the early 2000s and is still at high
levels although it has already begun to decrease for the large financial sectors of France and Germany.
Moreover, the model provides estimates of loan price distortions and thus, allocative efficiency in the
banking sector. Estimates of allocative efficiency and their pattern over time, provides corroborating
evidence to risk aversion, prudence, and our generalized risk measure.
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Figure 1. Sample distributions of measures of risk aversion
The figure presents the sample distribution of bank-specific and time-varying estimates of the risk aversion parameter, α. i) We
estimate jointly (17) and (14) by GMM to estimate the technology parameters, θ. ii) Given estimates θˆwe recover log p˜m,it
p˜1,it
from
(13). iii) In turn, given log p˜m,it
p˜1,it
we solve the expressions in (7) and (9) in terms of α, δ of a nonlinear system of equations given
the data, for bank-specific and time-varying estimates of αit, δit . Parameters µ and Σare assumed the same for all banks and years
in the same country but different across countries and are estimated using their sample counterparts from (1).
Figure 2. Sample distributions of measures of downside risk aversion
The figure presents the sample distribution of bank-specific and time-varying estimates of the downside risk aversion parameter, δ.
i) We estimate jointly (17) and (14) by GMM to estimate the technology parameters, θ. ii) Given estimates θˆwe recover log p˜m,it
p˜1,it
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from (13). iii) In turn, given log p˜m,it
p˜1,it
we solve the expressions in (7) and (9) in terms of α, δ of a nonlinear system of equations
given the data, for bank-specific and time-varying estimates of αit, δit . Parameters µ and Σare assumed the same for all banks
and years in the same country but different across countries and are estimated using their sample counterparts from (1).
Figure 3. Risk aversion measures over time
The figure presents estimates of risk aversion parameter, α, over time. The estimates are yearly averages across banks for different
grouping (PIIGS etc). i) We estimate jointly (17) and (14) by GMM to estimate the technology parameters, θ. ii) Given estimates
θˆwe recover log p˜m,it
p˜1,it
from (13). iii) In turn, given log p˜m,it
p˜1,it
we solve the expressions in (7) and (9) in terms of α, δ of a nonlinear
system of equations given the data, for bank-specific and time-varying estimates of αit, δit . Parameters µ and Σare assumed the
same for all banks and years in the same country but different across countries and are estimated using their sample counterparts
from (1).
19
Figure 4. Downside risk aversion measures over time
The figure presents estimates of downside risk aversion parameter, δ, over time. The estimates are yearly averages across banks for
different grouping (PIIGS etc). i) We estimate jointly (17) and (14) by GMM to estimate the technology parameters, θ. ii) Given
estimates θˆwe recover log p˜m,it
p˜1,it
from (13). iii) In turn, given log p˜m,it
p˜1,it
we solve the expressions in (7) and (9) in terms of α, δ of
a nonlinear system of equations given the data, for bank-specific and time-varying estimates of αit, δit . Parameters µ and Σare
assumed the same for all banks and years in the same country but different across countries and are estimated using their sample
counterparts from (1).
20
Figure 5. Generalized risk measures over time
In the figure shown are measures of generalized risk, det(Σˆt) over time. The measures are normalized to 1.000 for 2001. Generalized
risk measures are estimated using the factor model (22), (25) and (26).
Figure 6. Risk aversion sample distributions over time (Periphery)
The figure presents, for each year (2001-2011), the distribution across banks of the risk aversion parameter, α. The densities are
produced using a kernel technique using an Epanechnikov kernel. See the captions to Figure 2.
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APPENDIX. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
VARIABLE OBS MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX MEDIAN 
TOTALCOST 27187 251051.5 2118596 400 9.69E+07 25600 
WL 27187 1.372345 0.5482313 0.0045845 9.957204 1.363636 
WD 27187 2.925444 1.45002 0.0402936 19.9481 2.734338 
WC 27187 119.1985 192.7809 3.355705 1991.667 67.75956 
PLO 27187 8.638201 6.323479 0.4840662 145.7831 7.648243 
POEA 27187 3.552788 5.039146 -27.71947 145 2.542373 
RLO 27187 0.9944931 0.153318 0.016129 2.53605 0.995283 
ROEA 27187 0.2045313 0.1332156 -2.666667 2.146497 0.1826402 
LNTOTALASSETS 27187 13.40506 1.60163 8.219057 21.51282 13.22058 
LIQUIDITYRATIO 27187 16.85366 13.35406 0.0131752 95.89972 13.36217 
CASHRATIO 27187 2.00879 1.835655 0.0002079 64.43212 1.938426 
OBSRATIO 27187 8.738165 32.31466 0.0006494 3396.91 5.522683 
FUNDINGRATIO 27187 80.05762 17.08493 0.0319489 100 83.66225 
FUNDINGRATIOBROADER 27187 72.61329 18.14847 0.0319489 100 76.67171 
ZSCORE_BANKSPEC 27187 0.8829516 3.173709 -0.0342153 168.4996 0.4555166 
EQUITYTOTALASSETS 27187 7.251305 4.135922 0 86.35 6.24 
NIM 27187 2.622199 0.8642883 -2.22 15.61 2.63 
ROAA 27187 0.3435572 0.7718211 -46.27 11.21 0.27 
ROAE 27187 4.824281 11.60493 -458.17 775.51 4.37 
COM 27187 0.1410968 0.3481278 0 1 0 
INV 27187 0.0068415 0.0824315 0 1 0 
EST 27187 0.0111083 0.1048106 0 1 0 
SAV 27187 0.2644279 0.4410362 0 1 0 
COOP 27187 0.5765255 0.4941182 0 1 1 
COUNTR_ZSCORE 27187 17.99962 11.85795 2.03641 65.577 12.9567 
COUNTR_BANKCREDTOBANKDEP 27187 113.3285 22.67743 15.0084 206.223 114.537 
TOTALASSETS 27187 6534709 6.05E+07 3711 2.20E+09 551600 
EQUITY 27187 315604.9 2360113 200 8.56E+07 36000 
DEPOSITSSHORTTERMFUNDING 27187 3891900 2.92E+07 3157 1.21E+09 454100 
Y1 27187 3155331 2.28E+07 1306.5 7.51E+08 321400 
Y2 27187 3024273 3.71E+07 940 1.76E+09 177500 
PROFITBEFORETAX 27187 23406.14 371818.7 -1.85E+07 1.30E+07 2400 
 
 
